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Abstract
We develop and estimate a dynamic game of strategic rm expansion and contraction decisions to study
the role of rm size on future protability and market dominance. Modeling rm size is important
because retail chain dynamics are more richly driven by expansion and contraction than de novo entry
or permanent exit. Additionally, anticipated size spillovers may inuence the strategies of forward
looking rms making it dicult to analyze the eects of size without explicitly accounting for these
in the expectations and, hence, decisions of rms. Expansion may also be protable for some rms
while detrimental for others. Thus, we explicitly model and allow for heterogeneity in the dynamic
link between rm size and prots as well as potential for persistent brand eects through a rm-
specic unobservable. As a methodological contribution, we surmount the hurdle of estimating the
model by extending the Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) two-step procedure that circumvents solving
the game. The rst stage combines semi-parametric conditional choice probability estimation with a
particle lter to integrate out the serially correlated unobservables. The second stage uses a forward
simulation approach to estimate the payo parameters. Data on Canadian hamburger chains from
their inception in 1970 to 2005 provides evidence of rm-specic heterogeneity in brand eects, size
spillovers and persistence in protability. This heterogeneous dynamic linkage shows how McDonald's
becomes dominant and other chains falter as they evolve, thus aecting market structure and industry
concentration.
Keywords: Dynamic discrete choice, rm expansion, size spillovers, market dominance, retail chains,
persistence in prots, particle lter, serial correlation.
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1 Introduction
The strategic decision of a rm to expand or contract is inherently dynamic with long term impli-
cations for not only its market outcomes but also those of its rivals and, hence, industry structure
and evolution. We develop and estimate a dynamic game of strategic rm expansion and contrac-
tion decisions to study the role of rm size on future protability and, thus, market dominance
and structure. The anticipated eects of rm size on future protability, i.e., size spillovers, may
inuence the strategies of forward looking rms. This may in turn aect the evolution of market
structure. For example, rms may \over-expand" in periods when they expect positive spillovers
(e.g., Shen and Villas-Boas 2010). Moreover, these spillovers may not even be realized but would
still aect industry evolution. Therefore, it may not be possible to analyze the eects of size with-
out explicitly accounting for these in the expectations and, hence, decisions of rms. Expansion
may also be protable for some rms while detrimental for others. Consequently, we explicitly
model the potential for size spillovers and rm specic heterogeneity within these. However, this
presents a methodological obstacle, especially when some components of prots are unobserved
to the researcher and serially persistent over time due to heterogeneity in size spillovers and rm
specic eects. We also provide an estimation procedure to address this challenge.
In particular, our work is motivated by three issues. First, it is a stylized fact that the dynamics
of retail market structure are more richly driven by expansion and contraction than de novo entry
or permanent exit (Hanner et al., 2011). Most empirical models ignore these rich underlying
dynamics and focus on entry and exit. Second, there may be a heterogeneous relationship between
rm size and protability, i.e., some rms may grow and become more protable (e.g., Chandler,
1990, Hu and Robinson 1994, Robinson and Min 2002) whereas others may nd it detrimental
to expand (e.g., Fisher, McGowan, and Greenwood, 1983, Golder and Tellis, 1993, Kalyanaram,
Robinson, and Urban 1995, Min, Kalwani and Robinson 2006, Sutton 2007).1 Furthermore, even
within a given rm this relationship may vary with rm size. Demonstrating and understanding
this relationship is an empirical matter. It is important not just because of practical strategic
considerations for rms when deciding on expansion or contraction but also for public policy, e.g.,
1There is ample evidence of big rms such as Walmart, Amazon or Starbucks getting even bigger, see e.g., (The
Economist, 2012). In fact, sometimes expansion in itself is a key performance index for rms, e.g., recently a key
priority for the Four Seasons hotel chain has been to adopt a location growth strategy (The Economist, 2013). On
the other hand, there are many examples of rms that were once dominant but have since experienced various stages
of decline, e.g., Kmart, Circuit City, and Blockbuster. More interestingly, there is also evidence of rms that continue
to be dominant but have found that rapid rm expansion may come at the cost of quality, and thus, protability.
Indeed, Toyota's focus on size and growth has been blamed as one of the main reasons behind recent overlooked
safety issues with its cars (see e.g., BBC News, 2010, Cole, 2011).
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whether some rms can become dominant relegating others to the fringe, and the consequences of
this for market structure. Moreover, if a dynamic link exists between rm size and protability then
it implies that a forward-looking strategic rm will incorporate such size spillovers in its decision
to expand or contract, which has implications for estimating the eect of a rm's size on its payos
and decisions. Third, static and dynamic games conventionally account for unobserved (to the
researcher) rm specic heterogeneity in prots using a time invariant xed eect, if at all. In a
dynamic setting rm specic unobserved heterogeneity in prots may display serial persistence and
also evolve based on the history of the rm's actions. Accounting for such time varying unobserved
heterogeneity in prots when estimating a dynamic game presents a severe econometric challenge.
To our knowledge these three issues have not been studied in a unied setting in the existing
literature on dynamic oligopoly models. Thus, we develop and estimate a dynamic game based on
micro foundations of strategic interaction between forward looking rms that recognize that rm
size may aect future protability and competitiveness. In the model, rms choose to expand or
contract and rm size is endogenous. Size, in turn, has spillovers on a rm's future protability,
and thereby on its relative dominance2 and market structure. Additionally, the model allows for
heterogeneity in the dynamic link between rm size and future protability either due to inter-
temporal spillovers of size or persistence in past protability shocks. This link is incorporated
through a rm specic unobservable (to the researcher) variable.
Given the current state of econometric methods (see e.g., Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes,
2007) it remains very dicult to estimate such a dynamic game that contains a rm specic variable
that is potentially unobserved (to the researcher), serially correlated and subject to endogenous
feedback. The hurdle of estimating the model is surmounted by extending a two-step procedure that
doesn't require solving the game, that was proposed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), building
in turn on the work of Hotz and Miller (1993) and Hotz, et al. (1994). The rst stage combines
semi-parametric conditional choice probability estimation with a particle lter, or sequential Monte
Carlo procedure, to integrate out the serially correlated unobservables. The second stage uses a
forward simulation approach to estimate payo parameters.
As a step to understanding the dynamic linkages between rm size, protability and market
dominance, our work builds on various literatures. The cornerstone of our work is the literature
on estimating static and dynamic games of entry (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991a,1991b, Berry,
2Given the lack of a single agreed upon denition for what constitutes a fringe or dominant rm, in what follows
we dene a rm to be dominant if it has larger than equal market share.
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1992, Ericson and Pakes, 1995, Scott Morton, 1999, Seim, 2006, Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry
2007, Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007, Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 2008, Ellickson and Misra,
2008, Zhu and Singh, 2009, Zhu, Singh and Manuszak 2009, Vitorino, 2012, Datta and Sudhir,
2013, Orhun, 2013, Collard-Wexler, 2013, Shen, 2014, Igami and Yang, 2015) that has used entry
and exit decisions of rms to estimate the primitive parameters of the payos, and hence, infer
industry conduct. In particular, we extend the workhorse model of entry (e.g., Bresnahan and
Reiss, 1991b, Berry, 1992) to a dynamic setting to allow for rm expansion or contraction and
endogenous evolution of rm size.3
To model the dynamic link between rm size and future protability using inter-temporal size
spillovers and persistence in past protability, we borrow from the literature on rm size, capacity
expansion and industry dynamics (e.g., Lucas, 1978; Rao and Rutenberg, 1979; Jovanovic, 1982;
Hopenhayn, 1992; Boulding and Staelin, 1990; Shen and Villas-Boas, 2010). In particular, we
model a rm level protability shock that follows a Markov process (e.g., Ijiri and Simon, 1967,
Jovanovic, 1982, Hopenhayn, 1992). Further, we endogenize this shock to past rm decisions as in
Ericson and Pakes (1995). They treat the shocks as endogenous to rm R&D decisions while in
our case we treat the protability shock as a function of rm size. This is predicated on the fact
that rm size expansion via store proliferation is a key investment and strategic decision for retail
chains, and a proxy for their experience and familiarity with the market.4 Although, given our
data we cannot disentangle the underlying sources of the rm size spillovers,5 such as learning by
doing, or economies of scale or scope, our empirical implementation of the link between protability
and size spillovers is related to the long literature on learning by doing, e.g., Arrow (1962), Bass
(1980), Dolan and Jeuland (1981), Rao and Bass (1985) Benkard (2000, 2004), Besanko et al.
(2010), Bollinger and Gillingham (2013). Moreover, as in Benkard (2000) and Besanko et al.
(2010) we allow for persistence of the past protability shocks, which may loosely be interpreted as
institutional memory.6 Our empirical specication of the controlled stochastic process that denes
3Collard-Wexler (2013) also allows for rm size to be endogenous but in contrast to his model where rms may
choose to be \small," \medium," or \large," our model allows for a much ner choice of rm size.
4A common practice now for retail chains is to purchase the land that houses their stores (Love, 1995). In that
sense, expansion or contraction can be seen as strategic real estate investment decisions.
5One may also broadly relate our research in to the dynamic link between rm size and unobserved protability
to the extensive literature on estimating Total Factor Productivity (TFP), where this measure can be thought of
as the residual (and unobserved) component that explains variation in output after relevant inputs have been taken
into account. TFP (or the Solow residual) is often considered to be a measure of long run technological change or
technological productivity of an economy. See Syverson (2011) for a recent, comprehensive survey of this literature.
6Previous research has generated mixed ndings about institutional memory or organizational forgetting. For
instance, Argote, Beckman, and Epple (1990), Darr, Argote, and Epple (1995), Epple, Argote and Devadas (1991),
and Epple, Argote and Murphy (1996) provide evidence in favor of depreciation with data from shipbuilding, pizza
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the rm level spillover can also be broadly linked to the literature on protability dynamics (e.g.,
Hall and Weiss, 1967; Schmalensee, 1989, Waring 1996). However, in contrast, our controlled
stochastic spillover process generates an endogenous vector of serially correlated, unobserved rm-
specic state variables in the dynamic game.
Our work is related to the literature on using particle lters, or sequential Monte Carlo, to
control for serially correlated unobserved heterogeneity in dynamic models. A special case of this
is the GHK simulator (see e.g., Keane, 1994, Erdem and Keane, 1995) that arises for a particular
choice of the Gaussian distribution. Monte Carlo based Bayesian methods have also been used in
the estimation of single agent dynamic discrete choice models, e.g., Imai, Jain and Ching (2009) and
Norets (2009). It should be noted however that we use particle lters, or sequential Monte Carlo
methods, in a frequentist framework (e.g., Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003). More recently, particle
lters have also been used to estimate dynamic equilibrium models (e.g., Fernandez-Villaverde and
Rubio-Ramirez, 2007, Blevins, 2015, Gallant, Hong and Khwaja, 2014, 2015). We depart from
this literature in some important ways. We allow for explicit strategic interaction among agents in
the form of a dynamic game. Our two-step estimation method extends Blevins (2015) and allows
for endogenous feedback from past actions in the serially correlated rm specic unobservable
state. Moreover, our dynamic oligopoly model of rm size dynamics is estimated in a way that
is computationally easier to implement than the \full solution," or nested xed point, approach
adopted by Gallant, Hong and Khwaja (2014, 2015).
Our paper also provides a bridge between dynamic oligopoly models that explicitly incorporate
strategic interactions between forward-looking rms and the literature modeling serially correlated
unobservable variables using either Kalman lters in dynamic linear settings or particle lters in
reduced form models of rm decisions (e.g., Naik, Raman, and Winer 2005, Sriram, Chintagunta,
and Neelamegham 2006, Sriram and Kalwani 2007, Jap and Naik 2008, Bass et al. 2007, Bruce
2008). For example, Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar (2012) develop a demand model with latent
goodwill dynamics, location endogeneity, and spatial competition between retail outlets. The latent
goodwill state follows an AR(1) process and the model is estimated using a Kalman lter. In
contrast, our model is nonlinear in the latent protability state due to the forward-looking optimal
decision making behavior of agents, which gives rise to a dynamic programming problem, and
chains, truck production, and automotive assembly respectively. In contrast, Thompson (2007) nds a weaker de-
preciation eect in the shipbuilding industry once sucient controls are included in the analysis. Sorenson (2003)
provides evidence from the computer workstation manufacturing industry on heterogeneity in organizational learning
depending on internal rm and external market structure.
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endogenous feedback from the optimal decision to future values of the latent protability state. This
is the methodological challenge we face and our contribution is to develop a two-step approach to
estimate nonlinear, dynamic discrete (multinomial or ordered) choice models with serially-correlated
latent state variables following an arbitrary parametric law of motion.
Our method is also related to the work of Arcidiacono and Miller (2011), who provide an
empirical framework via expectation-maximization for integrating out persistent unobserved het-
erogeneity in dynamic discrete choice models. However, there are some key dierences: (i) our
method allows for the serially correlated unobservable to have continuous support, (ii) be rm (or
agent) specic as opposed to market specic, and (iii) endogenous to past agent actions.7
While our work focuses on within-rm size spillovers, there has been other related work that
looks at industry-wide or inter-rm spillovers, and \learning from others (consumers or rms)"
or \aggregate learning," e.g., Ching (2010), Shen (2014), Shen and Xiao (2014), Toivanen and
Waterson (2005), and Yang (2015a). While such factors are likely relevant in many retail industries,
it is unlikely they play a dominant role in explaining rm dynamics in our setting. In fact, using a
subset of the same raw data and focusing on the city of Toronto, Yang (2015a) nds that learning
from others accounts for at most 5% of the retail clustering observed in small neighborhood markets.
Using data on Canadian hamburger retail chains from their inception in 1970 to 2005, we study
the decision to expand or contract for A&W, Burger King, Harvey's, McDonald's, and Wendy's
across all Canadian cities. This setting provides us a suitable laboratory for studying the re-
lationship between rm size and market dominance.Firstly, the time period we study captures
comprehensive dynamics on the extensive margin, as is clearly reected in the raw data patterns.8
Secondly, each outlet that is constructed by a retail chain is nearly identical, in terms of outlet size
and product oerings. Therefore, the volatility in expansion and contraction helps map out the
spillovers of each rm's size over time. The estimated model generates a number of insights. First,
we demonstrate that our baseline model, one that incorporates a serially correlated unobserved
protability component, ts the data better than alternative models that ignore such eects. Sec-
ond, our estimates provide evidence of heterogeneity in brand eects, inter-temporal size spillovers
7Conceivably, Arcidiacono and Miller's (2011) method could be extended to allow for agent specic unobservables
but this might lead to a proliferation of parameters, e.g., if an agent specic transition matrix for the unobservables
is required. Similarly, the transition matrix could potentially be allowed to depend on lagged choices of agents but
we are unaware of such an implementation. Conversely, incorporating market specic unobservables instead of rm
(or agent) specic unobservables is a straightforward special case of our set up.
8The active periods of expansion in our data are consistent with views expressed through personal communication
with high-level real estate managers, from Harvey's, McDonald's, and Wendy's, who mentioned an overarching goal
of outlet growth during the time interval we study.
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and persistence in protability across rms. These in turn aect the evolution of prots and, hence,
expansion of dierent hamburger chains. Third, in particular, these aect McDonald's growth and
dominance over time. Fourth, we show that the market dominance McDonald's enjoys is robust
to various market and competitor level shocks. Overall, we nd that this heterogeneous dynamic
linkage shows how some rms become dominant and others falter as they expand, thus aecting
market structure and industry concentration.
The setting of hamburger chains in Canada has also been the subject of other research. In
particular, Igami and Yang (2015) also study expansion patterns in this industry.9 Relative to their
work, our model includes richer rm and market heterogeneity|both observed and unobserved|
and focuses on industry dynamics in a broader sense across the entire country. Our analysis
controls for more observed heterogeneity in three ways: we use data from all 31 cities in Canada,
we explicitly consider the identity of each rm, and we include more time-varying explanatory
variables. Igami and Yang (2015) focused on only the seven largest cities in Canada, they considered
two observed rm types (McDonald's and other rms), and they only used data on population
and income. Additionally, we use data on property values, minimum wage, Grey Cup hosting,
and smoking regulations. Controlling more thoroughly for observed heterogeneity is important
because the key substantive and methodological insights of our paper revolve around time-varying
unobserved heterogeneity. Igami and Yang (2015) allow for three discrete, permanent types in
their main specication using the approach of Arcidiacono and Miller (2011), which is based on
the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm. Our approach is based on novel particle ltering
methods and allows for richer forms of unobserved heterogeneity in the form of continuous variables
that vary over time and evolve both stochastically and endogenously. Finally, the focus of our paper
is quite dierent from that of Igami and Yang (2015). They focus on cannibalization and preemption
in a subset of very large cities and dene markets to be small neighborhoods (each with a 0.5 mile
radius) within those cities, in which these aspects are more pronounced. Our analysis focuses more
broadly on rm expansion in city-sized markets and uses data from all Canadian cities. In these
larger geographic areas we abstract away from the eects of cannibalization and preemption, which
will necessarily be muted since new outlets may still be located at some distance from existing
ones.10
9We also note a few other papers that study the Canadian fast food industry. First, Yang (2015a) examines
\aggregate learning" or learning from the decisions of other rms. In another paper, Yang (2015b) tests for preemption
in rm strategies using a reduced form approach. Similar to Igami and Yang (2015), the focus of these papers is on
much smaller geographic markets nested within metropolitan areas.
10An argument in favor of a broader market denition is that demand for fast food in one city is unlikely driven by
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2 Data and Empirical Patterns
2.1 Market Characteristics
For our analysis, we study the retail chain outlet expansion and contraction patterns across all
Canadian Census Metropolitan Areas (i.e., cities) from 1970 to 2005. The hamburger retail chains
we focus on are the main players in the industry during that time period: A&W, Burger King,
Harvey's, McDonald's, and Wendy's. In total, our panel covers 31 cities over 36 years for each of
the 5 retail chains. We interpret each city as an isolated market. Cities are separated by distances
of at least 60 km.11 We choose this denition of market for two main reasons. First, one could
make an argument, similar to Toivanen and Waterson (2005), that demand in one city's fast food
is unlikely driven by residents in another city at least 60 km away. Secondly, while individual
managers within each chain's real estate division have well-dened geographic jurisdictions, each
city's headquarters has a real estate manager that is in charge of the chain's overall growth strategy
for that city. With this denition of the market, in each year we observe how many new stores were
added, how many existing stores there are, and how many existing stores were closed.
Table 1 provides a snapshot of the main variables used for estimation. Most retailers have about
three outlets on average, across markets and over time, while McDonald's has about 12. Figure 1
displays the growth of the fast food industry as measured by the annual total number of outlets.12
The retail store entry and exit data in raw form was originally collected by Yang (2015a), who
used historical archives of phone directories to track each and every outlet that was ever in op-
eration in Canada. We augment this data with information from a number of sources. We add
market characteristics obtained from the Canadian Census. In particular, we have characteristics
that aect revenue, such as population and income, and characteristics that may aect the xed
costs, such as property value (as many retail chains purchase the land on which their restaurants
reside). We also include region-specic minimum wage levels over time from the Human Resources
residents in another city at least 60 km away (which is the minimum distance between any two cities in our data). On
the other hand with a smaller market denition such as city blocks or neighborhoods, demand across these geographic
markets may be correlated. For these reasons, a broad market denition has also been used in other past studies
about retail chains, such as Shen and Xiao (2014) and Toivanen and Waterson (2005).
11In terms of driving time between two cities in our sample that are in closest proximity to one another (Toronto
and Oshawa), one would need to drive at least 40 minutes.
12The literature typically refers to the share of revenues or sales as \market share." In the absence of data on sales
or revenues, in what follows by \market share" of a brand we mean the proportion of stores that the rm i owns
in market m at time t. We acknowledge that our use of the term market share is somewhat unconventional relative
to the literature, but on the other hand it is not illogical within our context. So we use it rather than invent new
terminology or use a more unwieldy phrase such as \the share of stores." Moreover, if we had data on revenues or
sales, then our approach would yield exactly the same denition of market share as commonly understood in the
literature.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. Obs.
Annual number of A&W outlets per city 4.5 6.9 0 50 1116
Annual number of Burger King outlets per city 2.6 3.7 0 23 1116
Annual number of Harvey's outlets per city 2.9 5.9 0 54 1116
Annual number of McDonald's outlets per city 12.3 21.7 0 164 1116
Annual number of Wendy's outlets per city 2.3 3.5 0 23 1116
Annual change in number of A&W outlets 0.2 0.9 -7 13 1116
Annual change in number of Burger King outlets 0.2 0.7 -2 10 1116
Annual change in number of Harvey's outlets 0.2 1.0 -14 18 1116
Annual change in number of McDonald's outlets 0.8 2.1 -7 29 1116
Annual change in number of Wendy's outlets 0.2 0.6 -4 6 1116
Annual number of cities entered by A&W 1.0 1.9 0 8 1116
Annual number of cities entered by Burger King 0.9 1.6 0 7 1116
Annual number of cities entered by Harvey's 0.9 1.2 0 4 1116
Annual number of cities entered by McDonald's 0.9 1.9 0 8 1116
Annual number of cities entered by Wendy's 0.9 1.5 0 6 1116
Annual number of cities exited by A&W 0.2 0.5 0 2 1116
Annual number of cities exited by Burger King 0.1 0.3 0 1 1116
Annual number of cities exited by Harvey's 0.1 0.4 0 2 1116
Annual number of cities exited by McDonald's 0.0 0.0 0 0 1116
Annual number of cities exited by Wendy's 0.1 0.2 0 1 1116
HHI (based on number of outlets) 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.0 1076
Population (millions) 0.4 0.5 0.1 2.9 1116
Income (millions) 0.1 0 0 0.1 1116
Property value (millions) 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.8 1116
Minimum wage 4.6 1.9 1.1 8 1116
0
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Figure 1: Evolution of Market Structure Over Time
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and Skills Development Canada online database. This provides an additional variable that controls
for cost, as fast food chains often hire workers at or near minimum wage. We also include informa-
tion about whether a city hosted the Canadian Football League's (CFL) Grey Cup championship
tournament.13 Finally, we use additional information about the roll-out of anti-smoking regula-
tions across Canadian municipalities. From Shields (2007), we obtained the years in which each
municipality introduced smoking by-laws that prohibit people from smoking in public places. In
Canada, these regulations were rst introduced in certain cities before being enacted more generally
at the provincial level. This additional data is included in our analysis as past work has shown that
smoking by-laws have an impact on the amount of food consumed in restaurants (Lewis, 2012).
2.2 Expansion and Contraction Patterns
To motivate our decision to focus on expansion and contraction in the dynamic oligopoly model,
we present total counts of entry, exit, re-entry, and re-exit. Table 2 illustrates that while there
is variation in these events across retail chains, there is disproportionately more expansion and
contraction than pure entry and exit. This pattern is consistent with recent evidence that changes
in market shares and industry structure among retailers are largely due to expansion and contraction
by incumbents rather than de novo entry or permanent exit (Hanner et al., 2011).
To focus on a concrete example, consider A&W's experience in Abbotsford, British Columbia.
It rst entered the city in 1972, exited in 1975, re-entered in 1976, and exited again in 1984. A&W
re-entered in 1988, and then expanded by one store per year in 1991 and 1992, followed by a
contraction of two stores in 1993, expansion by one store per year in 1994 and 1995, contraction of
two stores in 1996, expansion of two stores in 1997, contraction of one store in 1999, and expansion
of one store in 2002. Hence, most of A&W's decisions after 1988 would not be captured by a model
of entry and exit alone. Furthermore, modeling expansion and contraction patterns will identify
dynamics otherwise left out by focusing solely on entry and exit, and the eects of these dynamics
on market structure and its evolution.
13This event is the Canadian equivalent to the National Football League's (NFL) Super Bowl. Each year, a
city is selected to host the Grey Cup by a board of governors at the CFL. While this process is done through
a bidding process to ensure that a certain level of revenue can be generated, the board tries to rotate the event
across all member cities. The Grey Cup event draws in fans from all provinces, and is said to generate signicant
revenues for the host city (Johnstone, 2012). There may also be some long-run benets in the form of improved
infrastructure and construction of new facilities, as these investments are often conditions of the submitted bids.
Refer to http://cfldb.ca/faq/league/ for more details.
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Table 2: Average Annual Expansion and Contraction by Chain.
Chain Expansion Contraction Entry Exit Re-Entry Re-Exit
A&W 237 78 25 4 4 1
Burger King 178 45 31 3 3 0
Harvey's 186 44 27 4 2 0
McDonald's 380 17 23 1 1 1
Wendy's 184 27 31 4 4 2
Table 3: Market Expansion Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A&W Burger King Harvey's McDonald's Wendy's
Lagged A&W expansion 0.0475
(0.0809)
Lagged Burger King expansion 0.0228
(0.0520)
Lagged Harvey's expansion 0.0867
(0.0252)
Lagged McDonald's expansion 0.0245
(0.0116)
Lagged Wendy's expansion 0.132
(0.0542)
Observations 1116 1116 1116 1116 1116
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors (by market) in parentheses.  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001.
2.3 Persistence in Expansion
Our aim is to understand the dynamic link between rm size, protability and market dominance
and the persistence in protability that this might imply. This persistence will also materialize
through correlation between past and current rm expansion. For example, if increases in rm
size lead to greater protability and hence even more expansion, then there should be a positive
correlation between past and current expansion. On the other hand if rm size is detrimental to
protability then there should be a negative correlation between past and current expansion. To
study the relationship between rm size and subsequent market dominance, we rst examine the
raw data and then consider the linear regression of current expansion on lagged expansion.
First, Figure 2 provides evidence that suggests there is a positive relationship between current
and past expansion. This link appears to be strongest for McDonald's. Second, the regression
results reported in Table 3 are consistent with the graphical patterns. That is, we nd evidence of a
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Figure 2: Current Expansion and Contraction vs. Past Expansion and Contraction
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positive relationship between past and current expansion for Harvey's, McDonald's, and Wendy's.14
In summary, these descriptive patterns suggest that there may indeed be a dynamic link be-
tween past and current protability, as exhibited through the correlation between past and current
expansion, and that if there is indeed such a link it may be dierent across rms. This, in turn,
suggests a link between rm size, protability, and market dominance.
3 Model
We consider a model of i = 1; : : : ; I forward-looking rms in a retail industry that make decisions
about operating in market m in every time period t. For a given market m, at the beginning of each
time period t, rm i must decide whether to expand or contract operations, or make no changes
to the number of outlets, i.e., nimt 2 f K; (K   1); : : : ; 1; 0; 1; : : : ;K   1;Kg. Based on this
decision the total stock of active outlets, Nimt  0, in city15 m at time t for rm i evolves as
Nimt = Nim;t 1 + nimt:
This formulation of expansion and contraction choices includes entry and exit as special cases.
Entry occurs when Nimt > 0 following Nim;t 1 = 0 and exit occurs when Nimt = 0 following
Nim;t 1 > 0. Each forward-looking rm i, whether incumbent or potential entrant, makes a decision
nimt to maximize its expected discounted stream of prots for each market m in each period t. In
the tradition of discrete choice models of entry and exit (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991a, 1991b,
Berry, 1992), we dene the reduced form one-shot payo function as
i(nimt; n imt; Nim;t 1; N im;t 1; XRmt; X
C
mt; Zimt; imt)
= R(nimt; n imt; Nim;t 1; N im;t 1; XRmt; Z
R
imt)
  C(nimt; n imt; Nim;t 1; N im;t 1; XCmt; ZCimt) + imt; (1)
where R is a revenue function, C is a cost function, and imt is a private payo shock. Here, n imt
is a vector of the number of outlets that i's rivals choose to open or close in city m at time t.
Similarly, N imt is a vector of the total number of outlets i's rivals have in market m in period t.
14We also explored alternative mechanisms that could lead to the patterns observed in Figure 2 and Table 3. For
example, the demand for fast food could be growing in a market in which case all chains would see an increase in
the number of outlets over time. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that, to rule out this alternative
mechanism we could investigate whether the current expansion of a particular chain is correlated with the past
expansion of its rivals. We found no evidence of this and so we proceed with the model introduced below, which is
based instead on spillovers within a chain across time.
15Since we dene each market to be a city we use these terms interchangeably.
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The revenue and cost shifters are XRmt and X
C
mt, respectively; for instance, population and income
would be included in XRmt, while real estate costs would be in X
C
mt. The variables Z
R
imt and Z
C
imt
are, respectively, the unobserved (to the researcher) revenue and cost components of protability of
the retailers. Furthermore, R and C are vectors of model parameters. Finally, imt is a privately
known i.i.d. prot shock (i.e., a structural error) drawn from a distribution F (i j Simt) with
support Vi  R, where Simt is the payo relevant state dened below.
Let Simt = (Nim;t 1; N im;t 1; XRmt; XCmt; Zmt) denote the current payo-relevant state from the
perspective of rm i in market m at time t. To be more precise, we specify the one-shot payo
function parametrically as follows:
i(nimt; n imt; Simt; imt) =
h
R1 X
R
mt   C1 XCmt   2
X
j 6=i
Njmt + 3Nimt + Zimt
i
 1fNimt > 0g
   1  1fNim;t 1 = 0; nimt > 0g    2  1fnimt > 0g  nimt
   3  1fNim;t 1 > 0; nimt < 0g  nimt + imt  1fNimt > 0g: (2)
The one-shot payo represents revenue net of costs. Revenue is a function of the size of the
market, as determined by R1 X
R
mt. However, if retailers face competition, their revenue is reduced
by 2
P
j 6=iNjmt. Each store brings in additional revenue totaling 3Nimt. In addition to the costs
R2 X
C
mt, the retailers face an entry cost,  1, per-outlet expansion cost,  2, and per-outlet salvage
or scrap value  3. The salvage or scrap value is gross of any contraction costs for the rm if these
exist, e.g., penalties for breaking a real estate rental lease, severance payments to workers, etc.
The dynamic link between rm size and protability arises in the model through unobserved
composite protability, Zimt  ZRimt + ZCimt. This composite protability follows a rm-specic
autoregressive process which evolves according to
Zimt = i + iZim;t 1 + i1Nim;t 1 + i2N2im;t 1 + i3N
3
im;t 1 + m + imt; (3)
where imt  N(0; !2i ) is i.i.d. Therefore, the parameters (i; i; i1; i2; i3; !i; m) fully characterize
the evolution of rm i's unobserved protability in market m, net of the i.i.d. shock imt.
This unobserved protability measure has three main components. The rst component, with
parameter i, is the persistence of protability, or in other words, the extent to which retailers retain
their past success (loosely speaking, \institutional retention or memory"). The second component,
the collective terms with coecients i1, i2, and i3, accounts for the changes in protability as
the chain's size in a given city changes over time (i.e., intertemporal size spillover). This empirical
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specication of persistence in protability and inter-temporal size spillovers in the unobserved
protability component Zimt is similar to the learning by doing process in Benkard (2000, 2004),
who in turn builds on Argote, Beckman and Epple (1990).16 Finally, there is the drift component
consisting of a rm-specic xed eect, i, which represents the long run average protability or
brand eect for rm i, and a city specic xed eect, m. Since this is an AR(1) process with
a potentially non-zero drift, due to the recursive structure, these eects account for any market-
or rm-specic dierences in the growth of unobserved protability over time. Finally, imt is a
normally distributed i.i.d. innovation to unobserved protability with standard deviation !i.
This specication allows for heterogeneity across rms since the parameters are chain-specic.
Therefore, this specication captures rm-market-specic unobserved heterogeneity that is poten-
tially serially correlated. Incorporating this time-varying endogenous protability in the model is
a critical aspect when studying the link between rm size, protability, and market dominance.
Although, this component of rm-specic protability is unobserved to the researcher, we assume
that Zimt is observed by all rms. However, the model allows for some elements of a rm's prof-
itability to be private information, e.g., proprietary technology or proprietary processes for supply
chain management or service operations, or manufacture of products. This information is incorpo-
rated in imt, which is known to rm i when making a decision but is not known by rm i's rivals.
Furthermore, this is the key dierence in the structural interpretation of the two components of
protability that are unobserved (to the researcher).
In summary, the model's structural parameters can be represented as  = (1; : : : ; I), where
i = (
R
1 ; 
C
1 ; 2; 3;  1;  2;  3; ; i; i1; i2; i3; !i; m):
The one-shot payo functions i depend implicitly on these parameters. Given an initial state
Simt at time t, the rm's expected present discounted prots, prior to the private shock imt being
realized, is
E
" 1X
=t
 ti(nim ; n im ; Sim ; im )
Simt
#
; (4)
where  is the discount factor, 0   < 1. The rm's objective is to maximize the present discounted
16The learning by doing literature typically estimates the relationship between costs or amount of inputs and
cumulative output (as proxy for past experience). Benkard (2000) estimates the relationship between labor input and
lagged cumulative output (allowing for depreciation to measure organizational forgetting), current output, and output
of a related product (to capture spillovers across products). Our specication of size spillovers and institutional
retention is more reduced form than, e.g., Argote, Beckman and Epple (1990), since it cannot disentangle the
underlying sources of these eects such as employee turnover etc. This is primarily because of the nature of our data
set. Potentially with better data the sources of such spillovers could be estimated. On the other hand, we embed
this specication in fully specied dynamic oligopoly model with strategic interaction among rms.
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value of its prots at each time period t taking as given the equilibrium action proles of other
rms. The expectation here is taken over the rms' actions and private shocks in the current period
as well as the future evolution of the state variables, private shocks, and actions of all rms.
We follow the literature in specifying a dynamic game of incomplete information and focusing
on Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) in pure strategies (e.g., Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes,
2007; Bajari, Benkard and Levin, 2007). In order to dene the MPE strategies for the game we
employ the following notation. Recall that Simt is the payo-relevant state for rm i in market m
at time t. Let Si denote the state space containing all feasible values of Simt for rm i and let Ni
denote rm i's choice set (i.e., nimt 2 Ni). Also, dene S to be the collection of Si. For simplicity,
we let Smt denote the market state, dened as the collection of the state variables Simt of all rms
in market m at time t. Similarly, let mt denote the collection of the i.i.d. private shocks imt of all
rms in market m at time t. A Markov strategy for rm i is a function i : S  R! Ni mapping
payo-relevant state variables and private information to the set of possible actions. We denote a
prole of Markov strategies by  = (1; : : : ; I).
The ex-ante value function Vi(Smt;) gives the expected present discounted value of prots
obtained by rm i when players use strategies  and the market state is Smt. Dropping the market
and time indices here, we dene the ex-ante value function recursively as
Vi(S;) = E

i((S; ); Si; i) + E

Vi(S
0;) j S; n = (S; )  S:
Here, (S; ) denotes the action prole (1(S; 1); : : : ; I(S; I)) and n denotes the same prole
represented as (n1; : : : ; nI). The outer expectation is over current values of the private shocks, ,
and hence current actions of rivals, given S. The inner expectation is with respect to the state
variable next period, S0, conditional on the state S and the actions of all rms in the current period
(ni; n i).
A MPE is dened as a Markov strategy prole  such that no rm i has an incentive to
unilaterally deviate from its strategy i while its rivals are playing according to their strategies in
 i. Thus, for any rm i there is no alternative Markov strategy ~i that yields higher expected
discounted prots (in terms of Vi()) than i while its rivals are using their strategies in  i.
Formally,  is an MPE if, for all rms i, all market states S, and for all alternative Markov
strategies ~i, the following condition holds:
Vi(S;i;  i)  Vi(S; ~i;  i): (5)
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Note that for the alternative Markov strategy prole (~i;  i), when the realized private informa-
tion is , the realized actions are ~ni = ~i(S; i) and n i =  i(S;  i). Therefore, the recursive
expression for the ex-ante value function is
Vi(S; ~i;  i) = E

i(~i(S; i);  i(S;  i); Si; i)
+ E

Vi(S
0; ~i;  i) j S; ~ni = ~i(S; i); n i =  i(S;  i)
  S:
Inside the outer expectation, the rst argument of the payo function i is ~ni = ~i(S; i), which
is the implied action by rm i under strategy ~i when the state is S and the realized private
information is i. Similarly, the second argument is n i =  i(S;  i), which is a prole of rival
actions given the state S and the vector of private information shocks  i.
We conclude the discussion of the theoretical model with a remark about equilibrium existence.
Compared to discrete-state models, little is known about equilibrium existence in dynamic games
with continuous states such as ours. The lack of theoretical results notwithstanding,17 it might still
be possible to explore the question numerically. It is computationally too burdensome to solve the
full model numerically due to the large choice set and a prohibitively large state space including
several discrete components and nine continuous components, ve of which are rm-specic latent
variables that are serially correlated and subject to feedback from lagged rm actions.18 However,
we successfully carried out an equilibrium search using a lower-dimensional counterpart to our
empirical model.19
4 Estimation
Solving for even a single equilibrium of the game is both intractable analytically and prohibitively
expensive computationally. Therefore, we employ a two-step approach to estimation which does
17Dutta and Sundaram (1998) provide results on existence of MPE in general Markovian games, however, it is not
straightforward to verify their conditions for our empirical model since, which necessarily diers in certain ways from
their theoretical framework.
18The state space has both discrete and continuous components. The discrete components are the number of outlets
operated by each of the ve rms along with indicators for smoking regulations and hosting the CFL Grey Cup. Using
the summary statistics in Table 1 to determine the maximum number of outlets operated by each rm (and adding
one value to indicate when rms are inactive), we note that there are over one billion possible combinations of these
discrete components: (50 + 1)  (23 + 1)  (54 + 1)  (164 + 1)  (23 + 1)  2  2 = 1; 066; 348; 800. Additionally,
there are nine continuous components: population, income, property value, minimum wage, and ve rm-specic
serially-correlated latent state variables.
19In particular, we extended the model of Igami and Yang (2015) by adding serially correlated, rm-specic states
dened by Zimt = 0:5Zim;t 1+0:1Nim;t 1+ imt in addition to population and income. We calibrated the remaining
parameters using their estimates and successfully found an equilibrium using the Pakes and McGuire (1994) algorithm.
We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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not require one to explicitly solve the model and allows one to consistently estimate the model
in the presence of multiple equilibria under standard assumptions. Our estimation procedure is
an augmented version of the method proposed by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007). In the rst
step, we estimate transition equations for the state variables, which characterize how the state
variables evolve, along with the reduced form policy functions for each of the rms, which map
state variables to actions and approximate the observed equilibrium behavior. In the second step,
we use these quantities to simulate the ex-ante value functions which are in turn used to impose the
equilibrium conditions in (5) via a minimum distance criterion function. This allows us to estimate
the structural parameters without ever directly solving the model. As with the original method, we
assume the state variables follow a rst-order Markov process and that the data are generated by
a single Markov perfect equilibrium and that all players expect the same equilibrium to be played
in all periods. The key dierence in our approach is the introduction of latent, rm-specic, and
time-varying state variables to control for unobserved, but possibly persistent dierences in prots
due to inter-temporal size spillovers and persistence in protability. To incorporate all of these
features, we build on the sequential Monte Carlo approaches of Blevins (2015) and Gallant, Hong
and Khwaja (2014, 2015).
4.1 First Stage Estimation
In the rst stage we jointly estimate the posterior distributions of rm-specic latent state variables
in each period (conditional on observed actions and states), parameters of the transition equations
for the latent and observed states, and policy functions that condition on the levels of the latent
states. We describe the estimation of state transition equations and policy functions in turn below,
before turning to the second stage.
Let XRmt be the vector of state variables related to revenue in market m at time t, such as
population, income and whether the city is hosting the CFL Grey Cup. Similarly, let XCmt be the
vector state variables related to costs, such as property value and minimum wage. We summarize
these exogenous state variables by collecting them in a vector Xmt = (X
R
mt; X
C
mt). We use similar
notation for the latent, endogenous state variables Zimt. Let Zmt = (Z1mt; : : : ; ZImt) denote the
vector of all rm-specic latent state variables in market m in period t. The variables Zimt are
endogenous. The evolution of these variables is inuenced by the lagged actions of each rm as well
as the lagged values Zim;t 1, according to (3). As such, we estimate the parameters of the law of
motion of Zimt for each i jointly with the policy functions as described below. On the other hand,
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the variables in Xmt are exogenous and so we estimate the parameters of the transition equations
for these variables separately from the other parameters.
Collectively, let  denote the vector of all rst-stage parameters: the coecients of the reduced
form policy functions, the coecients for the transition functions for the exogenous state variables,
and the parameters (i; i1; i2; i3; !i) and m for the law of motion for Zimt for each i and m as
specied in (3).20 The Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) method requires that in the rst step we
obtain consistent estimates of . Given data fnmt; XmtgTt=0 for the entire sample of m = 1; : : : ;M
markets, consistent estimates of  can be obtained by maximizing the following likelihood function,
LM () =
MY
m=1
TY
t=1
Lm(nmt; Xmt j Nm;t 1; Xm;t 1; )
=
MY
m=1
TY
t=1
Z
lm(nmt j Xmt; Zmt; ) p(Xmt j Xm;t 1; ) p(Zmt j Nm;t 1; Xm;t 1; ) dZmt: (6)
Here, the M subscript indicates the dependence of the likelihood function on the entire sample,
and the m subscript denotes dependence on the parameters for market m. The second equality
follows from using the structure of the model to decompose the likelihood for the observed data
in to three components after conditioning and integrating out the unobservable rm specic prof-
itability components Zmt. The three components in the likelihood are: (i) the rm-specic choice
probabilities lm conditional on Zmt that represent the reduced form policy functions, (ii) the joint
transition density of the observable state variables, and (iii) the posterior distribution of Zmt given
the data. It should be noted that although the posterior distribution of Zmt is a reduced form
component underlying it is the structural transition function for these unobserved state variables
(3). It is estimated in the process of computing the posterior distribution as we describe below.
We next discuss the specication and estimation of each component starting with the second and
third components and then nally the reduced form policy function. We pay particular attention
to the ecient calculation of the posterior distribution, which is the main technical innovation in
our estimation approach.
We begin with the second component as it is the easiest to describe. The joint transition density
of the observable state variables arises in this form because all variables in Xmt are exogenous
and independent of both Zm;t 1 and Nm;t 1. This allows us to estimate the parameters of the
transition density of the observable state variables separately, whereas the parameters of the other
20Note that although the latent state transition parameters are structural parameters, they are being estimated in
the rst stage, so there is some overlap between the parameters in  (described in Section 3) and . Recall also that
Nmt is a vector of the total number of outlets of rm i in market m at time t, and nmt is the analog for rm choices.
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two components of the likelihood LM are estimated jointly. Specically, the exogenous variables
Xmt evolve according to a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model described in the Appendix.
Since major sporting events such as the CFL Grey Cup are announced to the public far ahead of
time,21 we assume that retailers have perfect foresight about whether a city will host the event in
the future. A similar assumption is made for the roll-out of smoking by-laws, as these regulatory
changes are often announced (and debated) well in advance of the enactment date (Lewis, 2012).22
The posterior distribution p(Zmt j Nm;t 1; Xm;t 1; ) is the third main component of the like-
lihood function LM in (6) and is the implied distribution of Zmt given the parameters and the
data from last period. The main complication in estimating this model is that for each rm i,
Zimt is unobserved, serially correlated, and depends on lagged rm size through (3). In turn, the
reduced form policy functions depend on this unobserved protability state. Given this recursive
relationship between the rm choices about stores, and hence size, and the the unobserved Zimt, we
estimate the reduced form policy functions jointly with the transition process for Zimt by integrating
with respect to the posterior distribution of Zimt given the observed data.
Although, this posterior is not a model primitive, it can be calculated recursively using a
sequential Monte Carlo or particle ltering procedure, that requires three pieces of information: (i)
the initial distribution23 of the unobserved Zmt, (ii) the observation likelihood function lm from (6)
that relates the unobserved Zmt to the observed nmt, and (iii) the law of motion for the unobserved
Zmt given by (3). Once the process has been initialized using draws from the initial distribution,
the recursive procedure for obtaining the posterior p(Zmt j Nm;t 1; Xm;t 1; ) can be described in
two steps, starting with the lagged posterior p(Zm;t 1 j Nm;t 2; Xm;t 2; ). First, the updating step
applies Bayes' rule to obtain the ltering distribution given by (7) for period t  1,
p(Zm;t 1 j Nm;t 1; Xm;t 1; ) =
lm(nm;t 1; Xm;t 1 j Xm;t 2; Zm;t 1; )p(Zm;t 1 j Nm;t 2; Xm;t 2; )R
lm(nm;t 1; Xm;t 1 j Xm;t 2; Zm;t 1; )p(Zm;t 1 j Nm;t 2; Xm;t 2; ) dZm;t 1 : (7)
Second, the prediction step yields the posterior for Zmt with period t 1 information by integrating
with respect to the transition density for Zmt given Zm;t 1 and Nm;t 1 which we denote by q and
21For example, the cities hosting the 2013, 2014, and 2015 Grey Cup games were announced by the Canadian
Football League 772, 626, and 613 days in advance, respectively.
22The assumption is invoked when forward simulating these market characteristics in estimating the second stage
parameters as described below.
23The initial distribution p(Zim;0) was taken to be N(0; 1) in the empirical application.
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which is implied by (3):
p(Zmt j Nm;t 1; Xm;t 1; ) =Z
q(Zmt j Zm;t 1; Nm;t 1; )p(Zm;t 1 j Nm;t 1; Xm;t 1; ) dZm;t 1: (8)
Thus, the parameters for the Z processes enter the likelihood through the transition density q.
The fundamental challenge is that this distribution is dicult to evaluate analytically because
the rm's choices nimt are determined by a complicated, non-linear best response function that
depends on Zmt based on a Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the dynamic game. This is seen in
particular in (6) and (7) which include the observation likelihood lm incorporating the reduced form
policy function lm(nit j Xmt; Zmt; ). To solve this problem, we estimate the model using a particle
lter approach based on Blevins (2015) by extending it to allow for endogenous feedback from
the lagged size of rms. A non-linear particle lter makes it possible to approximate continuous
distributions by a nite collection of weighted point masses. Thus, we replace the integral over
the continuous distribution of Zmt by a summation over a nite number of support points with
weights. These weighted points are known as \particles" and are selected to incorporate all available
information about Zmt given the model, the data up to time t, and a vector of parameters to
eciently approximate the posterior distribution, which is then used to integrate the likelihood
sequentially in every time period t. In this procedure, the particles are given by the draws from
the distribution of Zmt and the weights by the observation density lm evaluated appropriately.
More details about this algorithm are provided in the Appendix. We next describe the empirical
specications of the reduced form policy functions and the transition density of Zmt.
There are two issues in estimating the reduced form policy functions. The rst is that we do
not know the true reduced form because nding it would involve nding the choice-specic value
functions and projecting them onto exogenous state variables. In our application, rms choose
each year how many stores by which to expand or contract, denoted by nimt. Since the choices
are naturally ordered and the costs are linear, in practice we approximate the reduced form policy
functions by estimating an ordered probit specication where the latent index is a suitably exible,
linear-in-parameters function of the exogenous state variables Xmt, their interactions and squares,
and the unobserved protability Zmt, and interactions between Xmt and Zmt.
24
24Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) suggest that the rst stage reduced form policy functions should be estimated
using exible nonparametric methods such as kernel regressions or sieve estimators. However, in practice this is
usually infeasible and the convention in the literature is to employ some form of parametric approximation, e.g.,
Ellickson and Misra (2008) use a multinomial logit.
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Table 4: Grouped expansion and contraction decisions by chain
Change in Outlets A&W Burger King Harvey's McDonald's Wendy's
(:::; 10] 0 0 1 0 0
( 10; 5] 1 0 0 8 0
( 5; 1] 77 45 43 9 27
0 801 893 886 719 905
[+1;+5) 138 102 108 189 109
[+5;+10) 65 43 43 123 42
[+10; :::) 2 2 3 30 2
The second complication in estimating the rst stage is that Zimt is a serially correlated unob-
servable. To deal with this, we evaluate the integrated likelihood function of the ordered probit that
approximates the reduced form policy function using draws from the particle ltering procedure
described above (see (7) and (8)).
In particular, we estimate an ordered probit model over the choices K = fk1; k2; : : : ; kKg with
k1 < k2 <    < kK . These values may range from negative to positive, representing expansion and
contraction decisions by rms. In our application, we choose K = f 10; 5; 1; 0; 1; 5; 10g. We
motivate this discretization with Table 4, which provides us the number of observations we see for
each expansion or contraction decision. The table shows that there are many instances where the
stock of outlets do not change, increase or decrease by one to ten outlets.
Each rm's decision depends on the value of a latent index, yimt, which can be exibly specied
to depend on a vectorWimt of state variables and higher order interaction terms. In our most exible
specication, Wimt includes Xmt, the squares of the components of Xmt, the rm's own Zimt, the
average of rival Z imt values, and pairwise interactions between Xmt and the Zimt, and rival Z imt
values.25 Following the literature, we use the following simple, but exible linear specication for
yimt that includes higher-order terms and interactions:
yimt = 
0Wimt + imt;
where imt is an independent and normally distributed error term with mean zero and unit vari-
ance.26 Also note that rm and city xed eects are captured by Zimt, as specied in (3), which is
a component of Wimt.
25We omit certain interactions with indicator variables such as Grey Cup hosting, since including the square of
such an indicator variable would introduce perfect multicollinearity. For the precise list of variables contained in
Wmt, see the reduced form estimates in Table 13 in the Appendix.
26We normalize the variance of the error term to one because the coecients in the payo function are only
identied up to scale. Moreover, since there is only a scalar unobservable there are no covariances to estimate or
report. Finally, to normalize the scale of Zimt, which is also included in the second stage, we x 
Z = 1.
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Decisions are related to the latent variable by a collection of threshold-crossing conditions:
nimt =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
k1 if y

imt  #1;
k2 if #1  yimt  #2;
...
...
kK if #K 1  yimt  #K :
The values #1; : : : ; #K are the K cuto parameters corresponding to each outcome. These cutos
are estimated along with the index coecients and the parameters in the law of motion for Zimt
using sieve maximum likelihood.
4.2 Second Stage Estimation
Once we have estimated policy functions that condition on Zimt and parameters for the laws of
motion of these variables, the second stage is conceptually identical to that of Bajari, Benkard, and
Levin (2007). As such, we briey summarize the steps below and reserve the full description for
the Appendix. In eect, since we can simulate values of Zimt we can treat these latent variables
the same way as the observable variables for the purposes of the second stage.
Recall that we have estimated rm policy functions and state transition equations in hand from
the rst stage. Each rm's estimated policy function describes how it will act given a particular
state and market structure. In equilibrium, each rm's strategy must agree with rival rms' beliefs.
We assume that rms have rational expectations about state transitions, so rm beliefs and the
state transition equations also agree. Therefore, the quantities estimated in the rst stage can be
used to simulate many sample paths, or alternative realizations, of the game in each market. Each
such path is a sequence of rm actions and state transitions.
These simulated paths are used to estimate ex-ante value functions. We can then use the
equilibrium conditions to form a minimum distance objective function to estimate the structural
parameters of the model. Although the second stage is unmodied with respect to Bajari, Benkard,
and Levin (2007), the incorporation of the latent state variables in the estimation in the rst stage
means that one can use the estimated structural parameters for the transition process of the latent
states (3) to obtain best-response functions for rms that depend not only on the exogenous state
variables, but also on the actions of the rm's rivals and the latent states, both of which are
endogenous.
The second stage uses the estimates ^ to approximate the MPE policy prole . Let ^ denote
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the estimated policies corresponding to ^. Using these estimated policies, we can then generate
the sequence of latent state vectors Zt, and subsequently, the sequence of prots. Discounting and
summing these prots yields an estimate of the valuations under the policies used.
Therefore, given policies ^ and structural parameters , we can simulate the ex ante value
function for a particular rm i in any possible initial state S1 = (N0; X1; Z1),
Vi(S1; ^; ) = E
" 1X
=1
 1i(^(S ;  ); S ; i ;)
S1; ^
#
' 1S
SX
s=1
TX
=1
 1i(^(Ss ; 
s
 ); S
s
 ; 
s
i ;);
where we simulate S paths of length T . Variables with superscript s are for simulation s with
s = 1; : : : ; S. In particular, ^(Ss ; 
s
 ) denotes a vector of simulated expansion or contraction actions
from the policy prole . The other variables are simulated according to their laws of motion, given
the parameters .
With this formulation, we can then repeat the same procedure using each of B dierent ini-
tial states, each under both the estimated optimal policies ^ and when one rm uses a random
alternative policy ~i. Each alternative policy is generated by randomly perturbing the subvector
of policy function parameters in  by adding a random vector %, where %  N(0; 2%I). Rather than
simply additively perturbing the latent index used in the threshold crossing rules, these perturba-
tions interact with the state variables. As discussed in Srisuma (2010), such alternative policies can
contain additional information that is helpful in identifying the structural parameters of interest.
We note that because the prot function is linear in parameters, as in Bajari, Benkard, and Levin
(2007), many values needed in these simulations can be pre-computed and reused as  changes.
Under the true parameters , by revealed preference, the estimated policy ^i for rm i must
yield a higher ex-ante valuation for that rm than any other policy ~i, given that the other rms
are using policies ^ i. Therefore, we can use the dierence in these two ex-ante valuations as a
basis for estimating . Each initial condition and alternative policy yields an separate inequality.
Let b index the inequalities, with each inequality consisting of an initial market structure and
state Sb1 = (N
b
0 ; X
b
1; Z
b
1), an index for the unilaterally deviating rm i, and an alternative policy ~i
for rm i. We denote the dierence in valuations for rm i and inequality b by
gb(^; ) = Vi(S
b
1; ^; )  Vi(Sb1; ~i; ^ i; ): (9)
In equilibrium, for the true parameter values, this dierence should be positive based on a revealed
preference argument. Hence, the minimum distance estimator of Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007)
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chooses ^ to minimize the violations of the equilibrium requirement in (9), i.e., minimizes the sum
of squared deviations from positivity in the function Q() dened as follows,
Q() =
1
B
BX
b=1
(minfgb(^; ); 0g)2:
4.3 Identication
An important component of our model is the presence of serially correlated rm-specic unobserved
protability shocks Zimt that arise due to size spillovers and persistence in protability. These are
integrated out of the likelihood in order to estimate and identify the structural payo function.
We use particle ltering or sequential Monte Carlo simulation to perform this integration. Particle
lters being in essence a Bayesian procedure require some form of parametric assumptions.27
The fundamental intuition for identication is very similar to that for other models that rely
on panel data in that we exploit variation in rm actions both within and across markets. How-
ever, since the model includes an unobservable serially correlated component Zimt, this variation is
used in conjunction with parametric distributional assumptions for the evolution of the unobserv-
able component (see, e.g., Pakes, 1986). It is important to note that the parametric assumptions
required to implement the particle lter procedure to integrate out the unobservable component
Zimt in estimation are also sucient to identify the model parameters. Alternatively put, no extra
parametric assumptions are required other than those needed to integrate out the serially persistent
unobservable component, while recognizing that implementing a particle lter necessitates para-
metric assumptions given its Bayesian nature. Given this backdrop we next discuss identication
in the heuristic style of Keane (2010) and Ching, Erdem and Keane (2013).28
27Although, a particle lter is essentially a Bayesian procedure there is nothing that precludes it from being used
as part of frequentist estimation routine as in our case (e.g., Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003). See e.g., Fernandez-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007), Imai, Jain and Ching (2009), Norets (2009), and Fang and Kung (2010) for
other applications of such Bayesian methods for integration. Hu and Shum (2012, 2013) provide conditions for non-
parametric identication of dynamic models with serially correlated unobservables, however, they do not consider the
case with endogenous feedback.
28As stated by Ching, Erdem and Keane (2013, p. 10) identication has multiple meanings: (1) \showing that the
parameters of a model are identied given the assumed model structure (italics from authors). This may involve formal
proof as well as intuitive discussion of what data patterns drive the estimates," (2) \analysis of which assumptions are
necessary (italics from authors) to estimate a model or just convenient" (i.e., nonparametric identication analysis),
and (3) examining \fragile identication," i.e., whether some \parameters may be formally identied but dicult to
pinpoint in nite samples." Our discussion is in the spirit of (1) above. Regarding (2) they further state (p. 10,
fn. 16), \Unfortunately, this literature has been misinterpreted by many researchers as suggesting that it may be
possible to obtain `model free evidence' about behavior. In fact, the approach of the nonparametric identication
literature is to make a priori assumptions about certain parts of a model and then show that some other part (e.g.,
the functional form of utility or an error distribution) is identied without further assumptions." Moreover, they also
state (p. 23), \It is important to remember that truly model-free evidence cannot exist. The simple empirical work
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The main dierence in our model from a typical dynamic oligopoly model for which the Bajari,
Benkard and Levin (2007) procedure might be applicable is that in the rst stage we jointly estimate
the policy functions that condition on the latent protability state Zimt, along with the parameters
of the transition equations (3) and the posterior distribution p(Zimt j Nim;t 1; Xm;t 1; ) for the rm
specic latent protability states. After the serially correlated unobservable states are integrated
out, identication of the primitives in the one-shot payo follows very much from the Bresnahan
and Reiss (1991a) framework (see e.g., Tamer 2003). The distinction is that in our case the one-shot
payo includes the eect () of the latent protability shock Zimt. A key exclusion restriction for
identifying this eect is that the competitors' lagged rm size N i;m;t 1 aects the current period
payos imt in (2) but not the transition of the rm-i-specic unobserved protability state Zimt
in (3). Alternatively, the exclusion restriction is that controlling for market xed eects, there
is no direct market wide protability spillover of each rm's lagged size.29 The key identication
assumption is that a rm's lagged size only directly aects its own latent protability state Zimt.
Of course, indirectly, in equilibrium through the actions of the rm, there is an eect on the actions
and outcomes of its rivals. Additional excluded variables are the exogenous state variables Ximt
that aect the current payos but not the evolution of the rm specic unobservable protability
component. Finally, in the forward simulation process, Zimt can also be thought of as a pre-
determined state variable that is excluded from the payos of the rival rms thus providing variation
in payos across rms (see e.g., Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 2003).30
The identication of institutional retention of past prots (i) and intertemporal size spillovers
(i1; i2; i3) in (3) may be considered in the following way. For rm i in market m at each
time t, the particle lter starting with a draw from an initial distribution p(Zim;0) uses (7) and
(8) to recursively compute the sequence (Zim;t; Zim;t 1; : : : ; Zim;0). Each Zim;t is projected on its
lagged value (Zim;t 1) and the corresponding lagged rm size (Nim;t 1). Using this projection the
that promises to deliver such evidence always relies on some assumptions. These assumptions are often left implicit
as a result of failure to present an explicit model. Often these implicit assumptions are (i) not obvious, (ii) hard to
understand, and (iii) very strong."
29One could consider a more general model of market-wide spillovers from, say, R&D or advertising of each rm
that makes the entire category more protable over and above what the market xed eect can capture. We abstract
from that situation. One approach to do this could be to include the sum of the lagged sizes of all rms in (3).
However, in that case one could not estimate heterogeneous rm specic spillovers. An alternative would be to
include the vector Nm;t 1, with the rm-specic eects being potentially heterogeneous. This would make the model
not only more computationally burdensome, but would also make identication more dicult by eliminating the
exclusion restriction described above. Our current approach lies somewhere in between these two extremes. We allow
for heterogeneity in spillovers across rms but restrict attention to internal rm specic spillovers.
30Recall, the assumption is that the protability components fZimtgIi=1 are observed by all rms but are unobserved
to the researcher. Thus, in the forward simulation process the rms know the draws of the fZimtgIi=1 from the particle
lter when making choices about stores.
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autocovariance between Zim;t and Zim;t 1 provides a measure of the retention of prots for a chain.
At the same time the variation over time within a market and across markets for a given chain in
the predetermined lagged rm size helps to pin down the inter-temporal size spillover for that chain
through the projection. As an analogy, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995, pp. 853-854), estimate
unobserved marginal costs by computing the the residual of the inverted rst order condition for
the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, and then projecting this on to a vector of product characteristics
that account for costs. In our case we don't have rst order conditions to invert since the rm's
choice set is discrete but the Zimt are computed recursively under the assumption that the rm
is making optimal decisions about adding or subtracting stores. This optimality is incorporated
through the observation likelihood lm in (6) and (7).
As one example of the variation used to disentangle and identify the eects of lagged rm size
Nim;t 1 and last period protability Zim;t 1 on current protability Zimt, suppose that the market
characteristics Xm;t 1 in the last period increased so as to increase rm i's prot, and therefore
Nim;t 1 has grown in response. Then suppose that Xmt in the current period returns to its previous
value but we still observe the rm continuing to expand and increase Nimt. This can only be due
to the positive size spillovers since the law of motion of Zimt, i.e., (3), is independent of Xm;t 1 and
so the given (xed) level of serial correlation between Zim;t 1 and Zimt cannot explain the higher
than usual growth in the rm size.31
Further basis for identication is provided by variation exhibited in the data for fNim;t 1g8i;m;t.
The summary statistics displayed in Table 1 and discussed in Section 2 conrm that there is
substantial variation in the number of outlets, ranging from 0 to as large as 164. Furthermore,
variation in the observable market characteristics and demographics over time serve as important
exclusion restrictions that have short- and long-term eects on the stock of outlets. The assumption
here is that these characteristics move independently of a rms' unobserved protability levels. For
these exclusion restrictions to have identifying power, we need at least one exogenous variable that
shifts the current and future shock of outlets. To ensure that we have such exogenous variables,
we apply these identication arguments with data we have collected on the CFL Grey Cup hosting
across cities, smoking regulation, and minimum wage policies across cities. For instance, cities tend
to experience greater fast food expansion during the years in which they host the CFL Grey Cup
versus years in which they do not. Furthermore, the fact that the CFL board of governors desires
to rotate the event across all cities in a fair manner adds some randomness to the assignment
31We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this example.
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of host cities. A similar argument can be made for the use of smoking regulation roll-out across
municipalities over time, as this regulatory change is permanent once implemented, and will thus
have an impact on the rms' future protability gains from the rm size spillovers. Minimum wage
regulation serves as another exclusion restriction; changes to the minimum wage have long-run cost
implications for retail chain expansion decisions. Firms may expand at dierent rates in response to
changes of the exogenous state variables, which may lead to additional expansion in future periods,
which in turn aids in identication of the nature of persistence in protability.32
5 Results
Table 5 contains estimates of the structural parameters of interest. This includes both the payo
parameters, estimated in the second stage, and the parameters of the law of motion of Zimt for
each rm, estimated in the rst stage. We report bootstrap standard errors.33 To avoid reporting
very small numbers, coecients on terms involving N are reported as coecients on N=100, with
corresponding scaling factors being used for variables involving N2 and N3.
In the rst stage, we estimate an ordered probit via sieve maximum likelihood, including all
exogenous variables and their interactions up to second order and interactions between exogenous
variables and each rm's own Zimt and the average value of Zjmt for rm i's rivals, j 6= i. We report
the remaining estimates, which are not of direct interest, in Tables 13 and 14 in the appendix. This
includes the ordered probit coecients and cutos as well as the market characteristic coecients
in the reduced form payo function (2).
To prepare for the minimum distance estimator in the second stage, we generated B = 3000
random inequalities. Each inequality consists of an alternative policy function, which we generate
by randomly perturbing the coecients and cutos of the estimated reduced form policy function,
and an initial state, which we draw randomly from the sample.
First, the coecients on Zimt in the payo function are positive in both specications that
include it. The main parameters of interest are those related to the law of motion of Zimt. Note
that Zimt is an AR(1) process with a drift term which also depends on the level, square, and cube of
the lagged number of own outlets. The parameters of this process dier across rms. Recalling the
law of motion for Zimt as dened in (3), for each rm i in each market m we can think of increments
to Zimt being decomposed into three primary components as Zimt = im + iZim;t 1 + imt, where
32We thank an anonymous referee for providing us with this insight.
33Given the computational burden we bootstrapped the standard errors using 96 replications (two replications per
core on each of four 12-core machines) with replacement from the sample of 31 markets for 36 years.
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Table 5: Structural Parameter Estimates
Parameter Z (with spillovers) Z (no spillovers) No Z
Z () 0.0335 (0.0101) 0.0997 (0.0198) { {
Rival N (2) -0.0287 (0.1754) -0.1880 (0.1325) -0.2988 (0.3672)
Own N (3) 1.0820 (0.2862) 0.5466 (0.3988) 0.5261 (1.0946)
Entry Cost ( 1) -0.6208 (0.0754) -0.5810 (0.0744) 0.2116 (0.2540)
Expansion Cost ( 2) -0.2565 (0.0532) -0.1568 (0.0717) -0.4106 (0.1838)
Scrap Value ( 3) 0.0676 (0.0614) -0.1924 (0.0920) -0.2610 (0.1812)
A&W
Firm f.e. (AW) 0.0000 { 0.0000 { { {
AR(1) (AW) 0.1050 (0.0024) 0.2090 (0.0062) { {
S.D. (!AW) 1.0937 (0.0217) 0.4052 (0.0192) { {
N (AW;1) 0.0202 (0.0002) { { { {
N2 (AW;2) 1.4061 (0.0185) { { { {
N3 (AW;3) -0.2949 (0.0022) { { { {
Burger King
Firm f.e. (BK) 0.0411 (0.0003) 0.0125 (0.0003) { {
AR(1) (BK) -0.0186 (0.0002) 0.0699 (0.0016) { {
S.D. (!BK) 0.7549 (0.0164) 0.4052 (0.0192) { {
N (BK;1) 0.0590 (0.0005) { { { {
N2 (BK;2) 0.3297 (0.0038) { { { {
N3 (BK;3) -0.0382 (0.0003) { { { {
Harvey's
Firm f.e. (HARV) 0.0353 (0.0003) 0.0086 (0.0002) { {
AR(1) (HARV) 0.0097 (0.0001) 0.0986 (0.0040) { {
S.D. (!HARV) 0.8447 (0.0193) 0.4052 (0.0192) { {
N (HARV;1) 0.0242 (0.0001) { { { {
N2 (HARV;2) 1.5496 (0.0141) { { { {
N3 (HARV;3) -0.0050 (0.0001) { { { {
McDonald's
Firm f.e. (MCD) 0.7076 (0.0157) 0.3612 (0.0077) { {
AR(1) (MCD) 0.2140 (0.0042) 0.3850 (0.0178) { {
S.D. (!MCD) 0.6782 (0.0126) 0.4052 (0.0192) { {
N (MCD;1) 0.0335 (0.0005) { { { {
N2 (MCD;2) 0.1277 (0.0011) { { { {
N3 (MCD;3) -0.1476 (0.0028) { { { {
Wendy's
Firm f.e. (WEND) 0.1271 (0.0012) -0.0032 (0.0001) { {
AR(1) (WEND) 0.1104 (0.0013) 0.2328 (0.0062) { {
S.D. (!WEND) 0.5329 (0.0071) 0.4052 (0.0192) { {
N (WEND;1) -0.0339 (0.0003) { { { {
N2 (WEND;2) 3.2709 (0.0432) { { { {
N3 (WEND;3) -0.0191 (0.0002) { { { {
Market Char. (1) Yes Yes Yes
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im is a rm-market-specic drift, i is the autoregressive or persistence in protability parameter,
and imt is an i.i.d. Gaussian innovation (with standard deviation !i). The drift component,
im = i + m + i1Nim;t 1 + i2N2im;t 1 + i3N
3
im;t 1, is further composed of three parts: a rm
xed eect or brand eect (i), a market xed eect (m), and a rm-specic inter-temporal size
spillover component (i1; i2; i3). The main specication, \Z (Spillovers)", contains all of these
components, the second specication, \Z (No Spillovers)", omits the size spillover component, and
the specication with no persistence, \No Z" omits the Zimt process entirely.
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The estimates indicate that there is substantial heterogeneity across chains. Since the drift
terms are similar to rm xed eects, we normalize AW to be zero and estimate the relative
dierences for the other rms. In the main specication with spillovers, we expected the coecient
on quadratic N term to be positive and the cubic coecient to be negative, reecting initially
increasing, then decreasing returns in the increments to the latent payo as a function of the
lagged number of stores.35 As shown in Table 5, this is indeed the case for all rms.
Overall, the brand or rm xed eect and persistence in prots (autoregressive coecient) is
strongest for McDonald's, which also has nearly the smallest standard deviation (second only to
Wendy's). Among all ve retailers, the evolution of A&W's latent state has the smallest brand
eect and also the largest standard deviation. Burger King then has the second smallest brand
eect term, second highest standard deviation, and relatively weak size spillovers. Compared to the
other rms, Harvey's and Wendy's have the largest quadratic spillover coecients and moderately
large brand eects and autoregressive coecients. This indicates a more transient payo benet
from having built more outlets in previous periods when compared, for example, to McDonald's.
The retailers appear to be sensitive to competition, but not in a statistically signicant way, and
earn higher prots as they build additional outlets. The insignicant competitive eect indicates
that consumers may view these chains as being relatively dierentiated. Alternatively, this could
also arise if the density of locations in each city is relative low so that the competition between
locations is small. Among the cost estimates, for the main specication the estimated initial cost
of entry ( 1) is more than twice the cost of building a single store ( 2). The estimated scrap values
( 3) are not signicantly positive, indicating that liquidating outlets is not lucrative.
34The \No Z" specication does, however, include rm and city xed eects which serve a similar role as the drift
terms in the Z processes. We do not, however, report the estimates of these xed eects as drift terms in Table 5 to
avoid confusion, since the values are not directly comparable across specications.
35We note that this is not the same as thinking about returns to scale more broadly, for which one has to consider
the entire payo function and the dynamic aspects of the problem including the entry and expansion costs and
competitive eects.
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5.1 Model Fit Comparison
Having estimated our model with three dierent specications, we now seek to determine which
specication best ts the observed data. We use three statistical criteria to evaluate the model t:
the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), and the mean
squared error (MSE) of the simulated model predictions.
The AIC and BIC criteria take into account the trade-o between the number of parameters
and the relative t (with the penalty being larger for BIC than AIC). The AIC and BIC values
for each model are reported in Table 13 in the appendix. In terms of both AIC and BIC, the \Z
(Spillovers)" specication is clearly preferred (AIC = 8018:45 and BIC = 8159:03) followed by the
\No Z" and \Z (No Spillovers)" specications, which have larger and quite similar AIC and BIC
values (respectively, AIC = 8232:80 and BIC = 8320:85; AIC = 8233:10 and BIC = 8344:33).
Next, we carry out simulations using each of the estimated specications and plot the average
number of outlets predicted by each. We then compare the t by evaluating the mean squared
error in the simulated predictions. To implement the model simulations and counterfactuals, we
employ a similar forward simulation approach as in Benkard, Bodoh-Creed, and Lazarev (2010),
which does not require one to solve a computationally intractable dynamic model. We provide
additional technical details about the simulations that follow in the appendix.
The main ndings from our model t simulations are displayed in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 plots
the evolution of store counts over time across these dierent scenarios, with the actual dynamics
found in the data serving as a benchmark. For each rm, we plot the average number of outlets
(averaged across markets) each period observed in the data and the average simulated number of
outlets with each of three model specications (averaged over 250 simulations for each market, then
across markets). The simulation runs are initialized using the observed market characteristics and
number of outlets at the beginning of our sample. Since we are essentially forecasting 36 years
ahead, dierences relative to the observed number of outlets are expected. However, in that sense
all three models perform quite well.
The \Z (Spillovers)" specication, which includes persistent unobserved protability via the Z
process (3) and allows for size spillovers, also has the lowest MSE. The ranking of the other two
specications is interchanged under the MSE criterion, with the \No Z" specication without the Z
process having the highest MSE. Additionally, the estimated entry cost for the \No Z" specication
is positive, as shown in Table 5, which is contrary to economic theory. This underscores the need
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Figure 3: Comparison of Average Number of Outlets by Model Specication
32
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
M
ea
n 
Sq
ua
re
d 
Er
ro
r
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
No Z Z (with spillovers)
Z (no spillovers)
Figure 4: Mean Squared Error of Simulated Model Fit
for incorporating rm specic unobserved heterogeneity and the choice of \Z (Spillovers)" as our
preferred specication.
5.2 Drivers of McDonald's Dominance
With the estimated structural model of retail chain dynamics, we can better understand the evolu-
tion of market dominance based on rm specic heterogeneity in serially correlated unobserved
protability as determined by combination of brand eects (i), inter-temporal size spillovers
(i1; i2; i3) and persistence in protability (i). First, as described above McDonald's has the
largest value of the brand eect (i) which is more than ve times that of any of the other chains.
Note, also that A&W's brand eect is normalized to zero for identication. Since the brand ef-
fect is a time invariant xed eect it permanently raises McDonald's protability relative to its
competitors. Second, McDonald's also has a very high persistence parameter (i), almost twice as
large as any of its rivals. Given this high degree of serial persistence in unobserved protability for
McDonald's, the cumulative eects of its brand strength are magnied much more than the one-
period competitive advantage that the brand eects seems to suggest. Third, the inter-temporal
size spillover parameters (i1; i2; i3) for McDonald's have the expected signs, although, these are
not particularly larger compared to those of its rivals. However, once again their eect is magni-
ed in combination with the strong persistence in protability to signicantly increase McDonald's
long run cumulative protability. On the other hand, while the competitors of McDonald's may
have somewhat stronger inter-temporal size spillovers they also exhibit much weaker persistence
in protability. This implies that cumulative benet from having built more outlets in previous
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Table 6: Means and Variances of Stationary Distributions of Unobserved Protability
Mean Variance
A&W 0.1028 1.2096
Burger King 0.1356 0.5701
Harvey's 0.1285 0.7136
McDonald's 1.0172 0.4821
Wendy's 0.2462 0.2875
periods when compared, for example, to McDonald's is much more transient for its rivals.
Given the important role played by the persistence in protability we next investigate and com-
pare the unobserved protability processes for the dierent retail chains in terms of the statistical
properties of the processes and their stationary distributions.
First, Table 6 reports the means and variances of the stationary distributions for each rm.
Since the mean values vary across markets, due to the inclusion of market-specic drift parameters,
we report averages across all markets. The mean for McDonald's is over four times larger than that
of Wendy's, which has the second highest mean, and over seven times larger than the other chains.
Furthermore, McDonald's also has the second smallest variance, which is about 68% larger than
that of Wendy's, which has the smallest variance. A&W has both the smallest mean, just behind
Harvey's and Burger King, and the largest variance, being 70% larger than that of Harvey's (the
next highest) and four times as large as Wendy's (the smallest).
As discussed above, the estimated inter-temporal spillover coecients (i1; i2; i3) imply the
biggest eects for A&W, Wendy's and Harvey's. However, these coecients provide a short-run
measure of spillovers from the one-period lag stock of stores on current prot. Given serial persis-
tence in prots it is crucial to also consider the long-term spillovers that account for the cumulative
eects of these short-run size spillovers based on persistence in protability. In order to assess the
long-term eects of spillovers due to persistence we conduct the following exercise. We compare the
autocovariance functions of Zit for each rm i. For k periods ahead, the autocovariance for rm
i is Cov(Zit; Zi;t+k) = 
k
i !
2
i =(1   2i ). Therefore, the persistence in the Zit process is determined
by both the autocorrelation coecient, i, and the standard deviation of the i.i.d. innovations,
!i. Larger values of either parameter will tend to increase the time until the process reverts back
to the mean following a shock implying greater persistence in protability. Table 7 reports the
autocovariances for k = 1; 2; 3; 4 periods ahead for each rm i. McDonald's has by far the most
persistence, due largely to its large autoregressive parameter. For A&W the initial eect of a shock
34
Table 7: Autocovariances of Unobserved Protability Processes by Firm
1 2 3 4
A&W 0.1270 0.0133 0.0014 0.0001
Burger King 0.0106 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
Harvey's 0.0069 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
McDonald's 0.1031 0.0221 0.0047 0.0010
Wendy's 0.0317 0.0035 0.0004 0.0000
is larger than for McDonald's, due to the large variance parameter for A&W, but the eect decays
more quickly than for McDonald's.
This analysis illustrates the drivers of McDonald's dominance. It shows that even if the absolute
short-run levels of inter-temporal spillovers are relatively small, \institutional memory" or retention
of these spillovers over a long enough period of time can lead to drastic cumulative eects. Overall,
what our analysis reveals is that brand eects, inter-temporal size spillovers and persistence in
protability can interact to have critical long-term consequences even if their short-run eects are
measurably small. Thus, even with small transitory eects these three sources of protability can
still combine to have far reaching repercussions that can aect a rm's market dominance (or lack
thereof) and market structure.
5.3 Robustness of McDonald's Dominance
Our next set of counterfactual simulations evaluates the robustness of McDonald's dominance in
light of shocks handicapping it relative to its competitors, and demand and supply shocks to the
economy.
First, we test the strength of McDonald's dominance relative to its rivals' capabilities by im-
posing an initial handicap on McDonald's in two ways. We summarize the results in terms of
discounted counterfactual prot shares (i.e., prot shares based on the present discounted value
of prots for each rm as opposed to the period-by-period prots). First, in Table 8 we posit a
series of scenarios in which all of the rival rms competing with McDonald's are endowed with
between 0 to 10 more outlets than they actually had in the rst time period. These simulations
indicate that even if the rival rms were endowed with one to two additional outlets each in the
rst year, McDonald's would still capture nearly one fth of discounted prots. Next, in Table 9
we consider scenarios where the rivals have initial draws of their unobserved protability, Zi, taken
from the stationary distribution for McDonald's instead of their own and then additionally inating
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Table 8: Discounted Prot Shares When McDonald's Rivals Have Additional Outlets
Additional Rival Outlets 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A&W 0.0451 0.0364 0.0372 0.0383 0.0398 0.0411 0.0421 0.0430 0.0437 0.0444 0.0449
Burger King 0.2051 0.2487 0.2560 0.2581 0.2601 0.2602 0.2621 0.2643 0.2663 0.2680 0.2695
Harvey's 0.2244 0.2472 0.2518 0.2530 0.2546 0.2560 0.2573 0.2596 0.2601 0.2622 0.2627
McDonald's 0.3142 0.2060 0.1937 0.1872 0.1810 0.1761 0.1710 0.1653 0.1597 0.1533 0.1473
Wendy's 0.2113 0.2617 0.2614 0.2633 0.2645 0.2666 0.2675 0.2677 0.2701 0.2722 0.2756
HHI 0.2378 0.2352 0.2361 0.2365 0.2368 0.2370 0.2375 0.2381 0.2390 0.2401 0.2413
Table 9: Discounted Prot Shares When McDonald's Rivals Have Better Initial Draws of Unob-
served Protability
Initial Draw Increase 0% 100% 200% 300% 400% 500% 1000% 2000% 3000%
A&W 0.0451 0.0368 0.0322 0.0299 0.0285 0.0279 0.0279 0.0300 0.0328
Burger King 0.2051 0.2316 0.2412 0.2468 0.2499 0.2522 0.2551 0.2576 0.2599
Harvey's 0.2244 0.2381 0.2468 0.2508 0.2531 0.2555 0.2592 0.2600 0.2616
McDonald's 0.3142 0.2589 0.2384 0.2286 0.2218 0.2165 0.2081 0.2025 0.1929
Wendy's 0.2113 0.2345 0.2413 0.2439 0.2466 0.2480 0.2497 0.2499 0.2528
HHI 0.2378 0.2337 0.2352 0.2364 0.2374 0.2380 0.2387 0.2383 0.2382
the initial draws by percentages ranging from 0% (no ination) to 3000%. Both of these exercises
illustrate that rival rms would need some initial advantage in order to compete on a level playing
eld with McDonald's.
In our next simulations, we look at how well McDonald's dominance withstands economic
downturns through both demand and supply shocks. In the rst four columns of Table 10, we
simulate the impact of a sudden drop in demand through a fall in income in 2006, around the time
of a major economic downturn in North America. The rst case captures the event in which income
in 2006 drops 10% from the 2005 level, the second case captures 5% drop relative to the 2005 level,
the third case captures 5% increase from the 2005 level, and the fourth case captures a 10% increase
from the 2005 level. Notice that McDonald's actually gains in terms of prot share in response to
both positive and negative shocks.36 For negative shocks, these prot share gains come largely at
the expense of Harvey's and Wendy's and for positive shocks, largely at the expense of Burger King
and Wendy's. In a similar manner, the last four columns of Table 10 report the simulated results of
a supply side cost shock in the form of changes to minimum wage. We consider the eect of sudden
increases or decreases in wage by 5 or 10 percent in 2006 on discounted prot shares. As in the
36We note that the share of McDonald's prot can increase under this scenario even while prots in levels decline.
Recall that we dene prot share as the share of the present discounted valuations, but since we do not observe
market-level prots we cannot simulate counterfactual prots in monetary terms.
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Table 10: Discounted Prot Shares in Response to Changes in Economic Conditions
Change in Income Change in Minimum Wage
-10% -5% 5% 10% -10% -5% 5% 10%
A&W 0.0451 0.0457 0.0475 0.0482 0.0461 0.0463 0.0469 0.0471
Burger King 0.2021 0.2003 0.1978 0.1977 0.2001 0.1991 0.1992 0.2002
Harvey's 0.2176 0.2188 0.2170 0.2155 0.2166 0.2186 0.2173 0.2162
McDonald's 0.3266 0.3262 0.3331 0.3349 0.3312 0.3285 0.3305 0.3298
Wendy's 0.2087 0.2089 0.2047 0.2037 0.2060 0.2076 0.2061 0.2067
HHI 0.2404 0.2402 0.2413 0.2415 0.2412 0.2405 0.2408 0.2405
previous counterfactual, McDonald's remains the market leader following downward and upward
shocks to the minimum wage. Thus, major economic shocks would not appear to aect McDonald's
overall leadership position in the retail hamburger industry. In summary, we nd that McDonald's
dominance is very robust to shocks to demand, supply, and the capabilities of its competitors.
6 Conclusions
Our paper presents a new empirical model of retail chain dynamics that allows for endogenous rm
size, heterogeneous eects of size on future protability, and the consequences for market domi-
nance and evolution. Through a rm specic unobservable the model accounts for a heterogeneous
dynamic link between rm size and protability, that may arise from inter-temporal size spillovers
and persistence in protability. The dynamic game is estimated by using a particle lter based
method to extend the Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) two-step estimator to incorporate time
varying rm specic unobserved heterogeneity subject to endogenous feedback.
Using data on Canadian hamburger retail chains, the estimated model reveals a link between
current size, future protability and market dominance. The analysis accounts for the possibility
that a forward-looking rm will incorporate such size spillovers in its decision to expand or contract,
which has implications for estimating the eect of a rm's size on its payos and decisions. The
estimated model produces several insights. First, it provides evidence of heterogeneity in brand
eects, inter-temporal size spillovers and persistence in protability across rms in a setting where
rms interact in a strategic manner. Second, the estimated model shows that McDonald's domi-
nance in Canada can be attributed to such eects. Third, it also shows that McDonald's advantage
via this dynamic linkage is robust to hypothetical scenarios with unexpected demand and supply
shocks, and when McDonald's faces a competitive handicap resulting from arbitrary increases in
rival outlets or protability during the initial year. Overall, we nd that the heterogeneous dynamic
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linkage between rm size and protability shows how some rms become dominant and others falter
as they expand, thus aecting market structure. Studying this relationship is an empirical matter
that is valuable not just because of strategic considerations for rms when deciding on expansion or
contraction but also for public policy, i.e., whether some rms can become dominant and marginal-
ize others, and the consequences for market structure. Finally, we also nd that our baseline model
that incorporates a serially correlated unobserved protability component ts the data better than
alternative models that ignore such rm specic latent heterogeneity.
Our work extends the basic entry and exit framework to allow for expansion and contraction
which may have broader application in other contexts where endogenous rm size or rm specic
time varying unobserved heterogeneity is important. More specically, our model and estimation
framework could be applied to other retail industries in which key decisions revolve around ex-
pansion and contraction via stores. We believe that our framework may uncover similar rm size
spillovers and persistence in protability in settings in which other studies have demonstrated a
growing wedge between large and small enterprises (e.g., Jia, 2008, Basker, Klimek, and Van, 2012).
Lastly, it is beyond the scope of our paper to identify and examine the underlying mechanisms
and specic elements of rm capabilities that lead to a dynamic link between rm size, protability
market dominance. This could be a topic for future research. Another caveat is that we abstract
away from potential national level expansion strategies in our analysis. For example, Holmes (2011)
examines Walmart's expansion based on its network of distribution centers and the economics of
density but in a single agent framework that does not account for strategic interaction between rms.
Such decisions may be important to consider if the retail chains are concerned about geographic
risk (e.g., Aguirregabiria, Clark, and Wang, 2013). However, there are two reasons we believe such
a concern may be mitigated in our context. First, hamburger retail store expansion or contraction
decisions are almost always made at the level of city headquarters. Second, although, a likely
strategy borne out of risk aversion may involve diversication of outlets across cities this would be
counteracted by an incentive to avoid losing the potential benets of city-wide rm size spillovers.
Finally, estimating expansion as a retail network decision is currently infeasible, in the form of
a fully dynamic game with a rich state space, heterogeneous players, and serial correlation in
unobservables with endogenous feedback. On the other hand, this suggests a very challenging but
ambitious avenue for future research.
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A Web Appendix (Not for Publication)
A.1 First Stage Estimation
In the rst stage, we maximize the log likelihood function with respect to the rst-stage parameters,
denoted . For each value of , the algorithm for evaluating the log likelihood function is as follows:
1. For each market m = 1; : : : ;M :
(a) Draw R particles, denoted ~Zrm;0, from the initial distribution of rm-specic spillover
levels. Each draw ~Zrm;0 is a vector of length I, with one component for each rm.
(b) For each t = 1; : : : ; T :
i. Transition each of the R particles ~Zrm;t 1 from period t  1 through the joint tran-
sition equation as determined by (3), given the current value of , to obtain a new
collection of particles denoted37 Zrmt.
ii. Calculate and store the joint likelihood (the product of the rm-specic choice prob-
abilities) associated with each particle, given the values of nmt and Xmt from the
data. Denote these values by prmt for r = 1; : : : ; R.
iii. Calculate and store the log likelihood value, given by log of the averaged joint
particle-specic likelihood values: lmt = ln

1
R
PR
r=1 p
r
mt

.
iv. Assign the likelihood prmt as an importance weight for each particle Z
r
mt.
v. Draw R new particles, denoted ~Zrmt for r = 1; : : : ; R by sampling with replacement
from the particles fZrmtgRr=1 in proportion to the assigned importance weights.38
2. Return the value of the log-likelihood function for the trial value of , LM () =
PM
m=1
PT
t=1 lmt.
A.2 Second Stage Estimation
In the second stage, we choose structural parameters  in order to maximize the minimum distance
objective function Q(). Initially, we construct a collection of B \inequalities" as follows:
1. Randomly draw B initial market structures, denoted (N b1 ; X
b
1; Z
b
1) for b = 1; : : : ; B, consisting
of exogenous state variables, rm-specic observable variables, and rm-specic unobservable
spillover levels.
37The distinction between ~Zrmt and Z
r
mt is intentional. The former are draws from the period t   1 ltering
distribution (for the latent states at time t   1 given period t   1 information) while the latter are draws from the
period t prediction distribution (for the latent states at time t using period t  1 information).
38Again, the tilde denotes that these are draws for period t updated with period t information.
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2. For each initial market structure indexed by b = 1; : : : ; B, choose a single rm i and draw a
random alternative policy function for that rm by adding a random vector %b  N(0; 2%I)
to the subvector of parameters in ^ related to the rst-stage policy functions. Let ~b denote
the policy prole where rm i is using the alternative policy while all other rms use the
estimated policies from ^.
Once the inequalities are determined, calculate the objective function Q() for any  as follows:
1. Given the estimated rst-stage parameters ^ and a vector of structural parameters , repeat
the following steps for each of the initial market structures indexed by b = 1; : : : ; B:
(a) Draw S sample paths of length T , each starting at (N b1 ; X
b
1; Z
b
1), using the laws of motion
determined by the given parameters ^ and . Store the discounted prots for the chosen
rm i for the simulated path.
Specically, for each simulated path s = 1; : : : ; S, for each time t = 1; : : : ; T :
i. Using the law of motion estimated in the rst stage, draw shocks to simulate a new
vector of rm-specic spillover levels, Zb;st .
ii. Using the tted SUR model, draw shocks and simulate new values for each of the
exogenous variables, Xb;st .
iii. Using the new spillover levels and exogenous variables, draw structural shocks and
evaluate the estimated policies ^ in order to simulate each rm's expansion or con-
traction decision, nb;sit .
iv. Calculate the stock of outlets for each rm, N b;sit = N
b;s
i;t 1 + n
b;s
it .
v. Calculate the structural period prots for rm i in period t under ^, denoted ^b;sit :
^b;sit = (N
b;s
it ; N
b;s
 it; X
b;s
t ; Z
b;s
t ; 
b;s
t ; ):
(b) Calculate the discounted prots for rm i from the perspective of the initial state for
each simulated path, V b;s(^; ) =
PT
t=1 
t 1^b;sit .
(c) Estimate the ex-ante value of being in state (N b1 ; X
b
1; Z
b
1) for rm i (when rms use the
estimated policies in the prole ^) by averaging the discounted prots over all S paths:
V b(^; ) = 1S
PS
s=1 V^
b;s(^; ).
(d) Repeat steps in part 1a to simulate S alternative paths of length T , also starting at
(N b1 ; X
b
1; Z
b
1) and using the parameters ^ and , but using the alternative policy from
~b for rm i. Let ~b;sit denote the prots earned by rm i in period t along path s.
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Table 11: SUR Model Estimates
Populationt Incomet Property Valuet Minimum Waget
Populationt 1 1.0043 (0.0031) 0.0007 (0.0003) 0.0035 (0.0020) -0.0194 (0.0142)
Incomet 1 0.0148 (0.1586) 0.8499 (0.0174) 0.4498 (0.1041) 1.4761 (0.7366)
Property Valuet 1 0.0118 (0.0147) 0.0018 (0.0016) 0.9359 (0.0096) 0.1401 (0.0682)
Minimum Waget 1 0.0010 (0.0008) 0.0002 (0.0001) -0.0010 (0.0005) 0.9869 (0.0037)
Intercept -0.0061 (0.0096) 0.0072 (0.0011) -0.0076 (0.0063) 0.1136 (0.0448)
(e) Calculate the discounted prots for rm i from the perspective of the initial state for
the alternative paths, V b;s(~b; ) =
PT
t=1 
t 1~b;sit .
(f) Estimate the ex-ante value of being in state (N b1 ; X
b
1; Z
b
1) for rm i (when using the
alternative policy against the estimimated policies of the rival rms) by averaging the
discounted prots over all S paths: V b(~b; ) = 1S
PS
s=1
~V b;s(~b; ).
(g) Calculate the dierence in the ex-ante valuations, gb(^; ) = V
b(^; )  V b(~b; ).
2. Use the values gb(^; ) for each of the B initial states and alternative policies to calculate the
value of the minimum distance function, Q() = 1B
PB
b=1(minfgb(^; ); 0g)2.
A.3 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) Model
To model the joint evolution of the exogenous state variables, we employ an SUR model. One
justication for this approach is that all of these variables may be correlated at some level. For
example, income and property value often move along similar trends. The SUR specication is:26666664
X1t
X2t
:::
Xkt
37777775 =
26666664
c1
c2
:::
ck
37777775+
26666664
A11 A12 ::: A1k
A21 A22 ::: A2k
:::
Ak1 Ak2 ::: Akk
37777775 
26666664
X1t 1
X2t 1
:::
Xkt 1
37777775+
26666664
e1t 1
e2t 1
:::
ekt 1
37777775
where E[ete
0
t] = 
 and where c = (c1; : : : ; ck), A = (aij), and 
 are parameters to be estimated.
Estimates of the intercepts c and the coecients A are reported in Table 11 and estimates for the
covariances are reported in Table 12.
A.4 Reduced Form Policy and Payo Estimates
Table 13 contains the reduced form policy estimates from the rst stage for each specication as
described in Section 4.1. As indicated in the table we include either city xed eects or city-specic
drift terms, denoted m, and rm xed eects or rm-specic drift terms in all specications. For
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Table 12: Estimated SUR Covariance Matrix
Populationt Incomet Property Valuet Minimum Waget
Populationt 1 2.2420 -0.0060 -0.0017 -0.3005
Incomet 1 -0.0060 0.0271 0.0011 -0.0102
Property Valuet 1 -0.0017 0.0011 0.9651 0.2625
Minimum Waget 1 -0.3005 -0.0102 0.2625 48.3756
Note: All entries have been multiplied by 103 for easier comparison.
specications which include the Z process the inclusion of drift terms is denoted as \Z" while in the
specication with only i.i.d. unobservables, the inclusion of xed eects is denoted as \Yes". For
both specications including the Z process, we used 1000 particles to approximate the distribution
of Zimt for each rm i, marketm, and time period t. Finally, Table 14 reports the remaining second-
stage estimates, which are the reduced form portion of payos involving market characteristics.
A.5 Additional Simulation Analysis Details
To implement the model simulations and counterfactuals, we employ a similar forward simulation
approach as in Benkard, Bodoh-Creed, and Lazarev (2010), which does not require one to solve
a computationally intractable dynamic model. First, we estimate the dierent specications (full
model with Z process, model without Z process, model with Z process but no spillovers) and store
the rst and second stage estimates.
We then initialize the market characteristics (i.e., population, income, property value, and
minimum wage) and market structure (i.e., the initial number of outlets for each chain) using data
for the rst year for each market. The unobserved and serially correlated Z process also needs
to be initialized in our simulations. We draw the rst period chain-market-specic Zi;m;1's from
the corresponding steady-state distributions at time period t = 1 under the assumption of no size
spillovers from t = 0 as by denition Ni;m;0 = 0 for all rms. Using the estimated Z process, under
these assumptions for each chain i in market m in the initial period t = 0, the stationary mean is
(i + m)=(1  i), and the stationary variance is !2i =(1  2i ) (see e.g., Hamilton, 1994, p. 53).
Using the estimates, inferred policy functions from the rst stage estimation, and SUR process
for the exogenous market characteristics, along with the initializations, we then forward simulate
the evolution of the number of stores and per-period prots across all markets m, for each of the
specications. In each market, we simulate 250 sample paths (with length of 36 years) given the
initial market conditions, distribution of Z's, and inferred policy functions.
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Table 13: Reduced Form Policy Estimates
Parameter Z (Spillovers) Z (No Spillovers) No Z
Population 0.0674 (0.0006) -0.1457 (0.0030) -0.1416 (0.0948)
Income 0.0759 (0.0010) 0.2019 (0.0017) 0.2081 (0.0197)
Property Value -0.0328 (0.0004) -0.1472 (0.0048) -0.1398 (0.0486)
Grey Cup Host 0.3742 (0.0072) 0.1436 (0.0044) 0.1479 (0.0755)
Smoking Regulation -0.1738 (0.0014) -0.0810 (0.0015) -0.1395 (0.1196)
Minimum Wage -0.1746 (0.0017) -0.1334 (0.0018) -0.1252 (0.0412)
Population2 0.0505 (0.0009) 0.0679 (0.0013) 0.0553 (0.0271)
Population  Income 0.0420 (0.0007) 0.0481 (0.0013) 0.0487 (0.0257)
Population  Prop. Value -0.0611 (0.0005) -0.0677 (0.0011) -0.0646 (0.0325)
Population  Min. Wage -0.0398 (0.0004) -0.0539 (0.0011) -0.0476 (0.0188)
Income2 -0.0214 (0.0002) -0.0219 (0.0003) -0.0233 (0.0035)
Income  Prop. Value -0.1038 (0.0012) -0.1287 (0.0004) -0.1323 (0.0088)
Income  Min. Wage 0.0359 (0.0006) 0.0334 (0.0006) 0.0354 (0.0062)
Property Value2 0.1278 (0.0015) 0.1700 (0.0014) 0.1709 (0.0205)
Property Value  Min. Wage 0.0123 (0.0001) 0.0140 (0.0005) 0.0139 (0.0150)
Minimum Wage2 -0.0150 (0.0002) -0.0145 (0.0003) -0.0146 (0.0088)
Own Z 1.0000 { 1.0000 { { {
Own Z  Population 0.2967 (0.0076) 0.0353 (0.0017) { {
Own Z  Income -0.0055 (0.0001) -0.0112 (0.0001) { {
Own Z  Prop. Value -0.0006 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) { {
Own Z  Min. Wage 0.0064 (0.0001) 0.0050 (0.0001) { {
Rival Z -0.1856 (0.0015) -0.1433 (0.0052) { {
Rival Z  Population 0.0045 (0.0000) 0.0083 (0.0002) { {
Rival Z  Income 0.0079 (0.0001) -0.0114 (0.0003) { {
Rival Z  Prop. Value -0.0023 (0.0000) -0.0115 (0.0002) { {
Rival Z  Min. Wage 0.0379 (0.0004) 0.0079 (0.0002) { {
Cuto 1 (#1) -7.1358 (0.1725) -4.0207 (0.1255) -3.4663 (0.8414)
Cuto 2 (#2) -4.5462 (0.1044) -3.1793 (0.1034) -2.8467 (0.1905)
Cuto 3 (#3) -3.3214 (0.0969) -2.3914 (0.1055) -2.1811 (0.1437)
Cuto 4 (#4) 0.9318 (0.0146) 0.8660 (0.0220) 0.8186 (0.0776)
Cuto 5 (#5) 1.9484 (0.0212) 1.6257 (0.0246) 1.5274 (0.0734)
Cuto 6 (#6) 2.5782 (0.0415) 2.0906 (0.0418) 1.9487 (0.0805)
Cuto 7 (#7) 3.7805 (0.0928) 2.8829 (0.1073) 2.6372 (0.1204)
City Fixed Eects (m) Z Z Yes
Firm Fixed Eects (i) Z Z Yes
Observations 5580 5580 5580
Particles 1000 1000 -
Log Likelihood -3918.23 -4044.55 -4059.40
AIC 8018.45 8233.10 8232.80
BIC 8159.03 8344.33 8320.85
Table 14: Reduced Form Payo Estimates
Parameter Z (Spillovers) Z (No spillovers) No Z
Population (1;1) 0.0372 (0.0190) 0.0096 (0.0145) -0.1169 (0.1197)
Income (1;2) -0.0041 (0.0056) -0.0040 (0.0083) 0.0319 (0.0348)
Property Value (1;3) 0.0139 (0.0110) -0.0060 (0.0131) -0.2162 (0.0616)
Grey Cup Host (1;4) 0.0034 (0.2181) 0.0910 (0.2968) 0.8161 (1.4234)
Smoking Regulation (1;5) 0.0476 (0.0344) 0.0488 (0.0392) 0.0036 (0.3305)
Minimum Wage (1;6) 0.0071 (0.0106) 0.0319 (0.0136) 0.1940 (0.0552)
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